Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure

for me to be here. I have a written statement that I would like to

ask to be made a part of the record, and I would like to summarize

it and try to particularly talk about points where I either disagree

or have an additional element to bring to bear than what we have

heard so far.

I start, I think, where all of the witnesses are,

and where I think all of you are as well. That is to say, Iraq is a

serious threat. Its leadership is committed to conventional aggression

and conventional pressure. Its leadership remains committed

to developing weapons of mass destruction and if we fail to contain

that, it poses not only a direct threat, but a threat to our containment

of nuclear weapons policy as a whole. We cannot succeed in

the nonproliferation policy if we do not succeed in stopping the

Iraqi program.

Third, I think our other policies in the Middle East are at risk

as long as we do not have an Iraqi policy that has the support of

the Arab countries, and inevitably interacts with their dislike of

our policy in the Middle East peace process and, I think, undermines

our effectiveness in both areas.

Finally, an area that has not been mentioned, but to me is of

great concern, is if the Iraqi sanctions are seen to fail it will undercut

one of the most important instruments of policy in the police

cold war period, and that has been our ability to persuade the Security

Council to impose sanctions in situations where we thought

that was in our interests.

We were able to do that in Libya, for example, and finally get

the trial of the terrorists who we believe blew up the airplane. We

were able to get it against Serbia and Yugoslavia, and it played an

important role in the change of regime there, and we have been

able to get it in other situations as well.

My fear is that, as these sanctions erode, people are coming to

understand that there is no legal mechanism to enforce these sanctions,

and that if other countries choose simply not to obey them,

that they can, in fact, get away with it. My fear is that not only

will we wake up one day and discover that the Iraqi sanctions are

gone, with, I think, very serious implications for Iraq policy, but

that it will become increasingly difficult in the future to persuade

countries to honor other sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security

Council.

These sanctions are often dangerous for the countries in the region.

They are always expensive for the countries in the region, because

they lose trade and they lose income. They have nevertheless

felt a legal obligation to do so, and I think the undercutting of that

would have very serious repercussions for American policy. So I

think whatever we do as we move forward, we need to keep in

mind the broader implications of what is at stake if we allow these

sanctions to fail.

I think that the differences that we have in this panel and in

general in the country about Iraq policy is not about how dangerous

Saddam Hussein is, it is not about the threat that he poses,

it is not about the importance of containing him, but it is about

what we should do about that. I think that turns on different assessments

of what is feasible, and those assessments do not turn

on any secret information.

My sense is that inside the government and inside the intelligence

community there is as much disagreement about the feasibility,

for example, of getting rid of Saddam Hussein by supporting

the opposition, as there is in the public as a whole. This seems to

turn as much on people’s temperament and what they would like

to believe than it does on any concrete facts.

Now, as I detail in my prepared statement, and I will not go into

here in detail, I think the most dangerous option is one of continuing

to drift, of continuing to allow the sanctions to slowly erode

while we try to keep them together, of continuing efforts to bring

back the inspectors, which I think simply will not lead to the inspectors

being brought back in, of continuing military operations,

which has already been suggested does not do very much—it is one

thing to maintain the principle firmly of the no-fly zones and to

make it clear that we will not permit military operations. It is another

to continue to fly in ways that do not seem to send any clear

message, clearly does not have any impact on Iraqi military capability.

And yet this both undercuts support for the policy in the region

and runs the risk that American lives will be taken for no precisely

clear purpose. So I think we need to look at alternatives, and I

think that there are two basic options.

One is to try to get agreement within the Security Council, particularly

among the P–5, and with the countries in the region, on

a new regime that would remain in place until there was a fundamental

change in the Government of Iraq, and that, I think, would

have several elements.

First, I think it would require that we drastically reduce the list

of items that Iraq is prohibited from importing only to weapons

themselves and to real dual-use items. In return, seek agreement,

which I believe we could get, that the control over Iraqi revenues

for the oil they are permitted to sell, to make sure that these expenditures

do not go for the unauthorized items, comes in place

and remains in place until there is a fundamental change in policy.

Second, I believe we need to recognize that a return of U.N. inspectors

is very unlikely and, as has already been suggested, even

if it occurred, it is not clear that it would do very much good, given

that they clearly will not have the freedom that we want, and also

that they have had time to hide their weapons programs some

place else.

Instead, I think we need simply to in effect say to the Iraqi Government

that these sanctions will continue until you find a way to

persuade the international community that you have abandoned

your efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.

I do not believe that Iraq could do that absent a fundamental

change in the regime and a putting in place of a very different kind

of government. So my view is that this set of sanctions needs to

remain in place until there is a change in government, but that we

ought to put the onus on Iraq, rather than continuing these ineffective

efforts and, I think, ultimately futile efforts to bring back inspectors.

In the case of the no-fly zone, what I think we need to do is

maintain clearly our assertion of the right to do it, but also to

make clear what our red lines are, that we will not permit the

Iraqis to move north, that we will not permit them to move against

the people in the southern part of their country, or to mobilize

against Kuwait or any other country. If they do that, we will respond

not with the kind of very limited military action we have

done regularly, or even the kind of stepped-up military action that

we saw a week or so ago, but with serious and decisive military action

of a kind that would, in fact, materially affect the capability

of the Iraqi military forces.

I think we should try, and I think we could succeed in getting

agreement from the countries whose bases we would need for those

operations, that this changed posture would have the support and

their agreement that decisive military action would take place if

any of these red lines were crossed.

Finally, as part of this I think we need to try to cut down on the

smuggling, which puts in the hands of the Iraqi leadership funds

that they could use for their own purposes, and which is the most

dangerous trend that is now developing.

We saw in the press that Secretary Powell has raised this issue

with the Syrians and, I believe, is part of the kind of change in policy

that I have suggested here, that we could get agreement from

the countries that have been running pipelines outside the embargo,

to bring those sales within the U.N. system so that we control

what Iraq does with the money.

In order to get the support of other key countries, including the

Russians and the French for this, I think we also ought to consider

whether some of the funds that Iraq brings in is used to pay off

their very large debts to foreign countries, including in particular,

France and Russia. I think it is no accident that the French and

the Russians have been pressing for a relaxing, if not elimination

of the embargo, and that these countries are very countries to

which Iraq owes a great deal of money.

I think it is not inconsistent with the embargo to begin to divert

some of the funds to pay off those debts, not only to those countries,

but to many other countries, as part of the set of things that

the U.N.-impounded money is used for.

As everybody has said, I think there can be no doubt to anybody

who looks at it objectively that the embargo plays no significant

role in the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Iraq has enough money

from the U.N. food for peace program, it has enough money from

the illegal smuggling program, to deal with those problems. It is

clear that the leadership prefers to spend its money on statues, on

palaces, and on weapons, and that you could give them a lot more

money and the problem would not change.

Nevertheless, it is also the case that we have paid a significant

price because people believe that somehow that we are at fault, I

do not believe more clever public diplomacy will solve this problem.

I think that a clear willingness to let Iraq spend money on many

other things is the key to beginning to turn this problem around.

Now, as we have heard before, and I am certain we will hear

from the last panelist, there is an alternative policy, and that is to

arm the opposition and to try to get rid of the current regime

quickly. I think there is no doubt that it would be in our interest

to do so. I think one can raise serious questions about whether we

should have done it when we had the chance to do so, when we had

an overwhelming army in the field, and we had defeated the Iraqi

military force, but I do not think we should allow ourselves the luxury

of believing that somehow this can be done on the cheap.

If we arm people and put them in the country, if we declare and

support the creation of safe zones in the north or in the south, we

have to mean it, and that means we have to be prepared to commit

as much military force as it will take to hold those zones against

an attack, and it means we cannot wait until they are attacked.

We do not have forces now in the region that can deal with that.

We twice now encouraged people to act and then stood there while

they were attacked, and I believe we should not have done it either

of those times, and I believe we should not do it again.

If we are serious about this, it means a buildup of American military

forces, maybe not to the level of the Persian Gulf war, but significantly

more than we now have, and it means that we have to

decide in advance that an attack on those forces is the equivalent

of an attack on the United States and we are ready to go back to

war against Iraq.

Now, I do not believe the American people are ready to support

that. I do not believe the Congress is ready to support that, but if

the administration is persuaded that that is the route to go, I think

before we start arming people who are going to need our military

support, we need to have that debate. We need to make that decision.

Since I continue to believe that the Constitution requires the

Congress to authorize us to go to war, I think we need a Resolution

of the Congress that says that we are prepared to protect these

people and to go to war to defend them.

I would welcome that debate. I think people would at the end of

the day say that the American interests are not such that we ought

to do that, but the policy of containment that I have outlined is

more prudent and more consistent with our interest, but what I

think would be a disaster would be to once more encourage people

to rise up and then to stand there and watch them be slaughtered.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a great privilege and a pleasure for me to testify once again

before this very distinguished committee. I first had the opportunity to appear before

this committee when it conducted far ranging hearings on China in 1966. I believe

that we are as urgently in need now of a serious debate on Iraq, as we were

then on China, and I commend this committee for holding these hearings.

There can be no doubt that what happens in Iraq and how we manage the process

of developing a consensus in the international community on Iraq is of enormous

importance to American and international security. This is so for at least four reasons.

First, as we learned dramatically a decade ago, Iraq has both the intention and

the capability to threaten its neighbors. There is no reason to think this has

changed. If Iraq were to conclude that the United States were no longer willing to

use force to protect its interests in the Gulf, it would be sorely tempted to press

its neighbors. Preventing conventional aggression by Iraq and maintaining the military

relations necessary for us to respond effectively if deterrence fails, must be a

high priority for the United States.

Second, Iraq poses a direct and immediate threat to our non-proliferation policy.

An Iraq with missiles and nuclear or biological weapons would pose a threat to all

nations within its reach, including Israel. Moreover, our efforts to extend the principles

of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the arc of states in this

area would be fatally undercut, if we are unable to prevent Iraq from developing

such weapons in the face of very explicit United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Third, our efforts to maintain support for the Middle East Peace Process among

the states of the region and to have their assistance on other critical issues, including

the price and supply of oil, critically depends on our securing the support of the

nation’s of the region for our Iraq policy. It is not only that the embargo will continue

to erode if it lacks support in the region, but it is also the case that our ability

to continue to have the support that we need on other issues will be jeopardized

if we pursue a policy towards Iraq which lacks support in the region.

Finally, if we permit the Iraqi sanctions to continue to erode in the face of a clear

Security Council mandate, we run the grave risk of undermining the respect for Security

Council sanctions, which have served American interests well in many parts

of the world.

One of the most important and positive developments of the post-cold war period,

was the willingness of the Security Council to use its powers under Chapter VII to

impose economic sanctions on states for a variety of infractions of the basic norms

of international law and the willingness of almost all states to abide by these rules.

We need to remember, however, that there are no effective means to force states

to comply with such embargoes and that they often do so at significant economic

cost. If the Iraq sanctions simply fail it will be much harder to get the Security

Council in the future to impose such sanctions and to get states to obey them.

I start with these points, Mr. Chairman, to underline two basic themes. There can

be no question that the stakes are high in how we deal with Iraq. Where there are

differences of view, and surely there are, regards how to accomplish these specific

goals in ways which are compatible with other world-wide interests. The differences

of opinion about what the United States should do in regard to Iraq reflect much

less disagreements about the threat posed by Iraq, than differences about how effective

different courses of action might be. This reflects the genuine difficulty in ferreting

out the facts and interpreting them. I do not believe that disagreements result

from differing access to classified information. People with full access disagree

with each other as much as they do with those who rely entirely on unclassified information.

I believe that there are three options that are likely to compete for adoption as

the Bush Administration reconsiders Iraq policy. The first would be a continuation

of the recent trends. The second would involve a refocusing of the sanctions. The

third will give higher priority to attempting to replace the current regime. In short,

I believe that the first option will inevitably end in disaster, and the third simply

cannot be implemented successfully. This leads me to support the second option of

focusing on the Iraqi program to develop weapons of mass destruction and its capacity

to threaten its neighbors.

Over the past several years there has been a steady erosion in the key elements

of our current Iraq policy:

We have gone from demanding sweeping changes in Iraq, beyond the end of the

program to develop weapons of mass destruction, before we would agree to end

the embargo, to making ending the weapons of mass destruction program essentially

the sole criteria.

We have gone from demanding the right of UN inspectors to go everywhere to

having no inspectors.

We have gone from severely limiting how much oil Iraq could sell to permitting

Iraq to sell as much oil as it can pump.

We have gone from severely limiting what Iraq can buy with the funds that it

gains from its oil sales to permitting it to purchase a much larger—but still

very limited—range of items.

And at the same time, as President Bush has noted, the embargo is becoming less

and less effective as more oil is sold outside the proscribed UN sanctioned scheme.

While the changes that have been made move us closer to what other countries, especially

France, Russia and our allies in the region want, there has not been a corresponding

increase in support for our Iraqi policy. On the contrary, support continues

to decline. Incremental changes simply erode our position without gaining

more support for what remains in place.

If we continue down this path Iraq will be able to buy more and more goods within

the sanction system, and will have more and more funds from sales conducted

in violation of the UN Security Council embargo. One day we will wake up and the

whole world will know that the sanctions are no longer working and many more

states will feel free to ignore them. The results will be disastrous not only for our

Iraq policy, but for our ability to employ UN sanctions in other situations and to

have states feel that they have an obligation to act consistent with UNSC resolutions

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Despite these clear dangers, the pressures within the government to make only

incremental changes in policy are so strong that it will take an act of will with substantial

Congressional and public support to move decisively.

Part of the task is to illuminate what the real options are. That is why these

hearings are so important and why I very much welcome this opportunity to lay out

the option which I believe is most consistent with American interests.

Our concerns about Iraq relate primarily to its effort to develop weapons of mass

destruction and to threaten the use of force against its neighbors. If we are to have

any chance of keeping the alliance against the current Iraqi regime together we

must focus on these concerns. In order to do that we should do the following:

Drastically reduce the list of items which Iraq is prohibited from purchasing

only to weapons themselves and to real dual use items which would directly

contribute to development of weapons of mass destruction. In return seek UNSC

agreement to have the UN sanctions committee continue to control the revenue

Iraq receives for its oil sales so that it can prevent expenditures on these few

unauthorized items.

Recognize that efforts to persuade Iraq to permit effective UN inspections on

its territory are very unlikely to succeed. Instead, focus on securing an agreement

among the P-5 that the controls on expenditures will remain in place until

Iraq either permits full inspection or finds some other affirmative means to persuade

the UNSC that it has abandoned its effort to develop weapons of mass

destruction or to threaten its neighbors with conventional aggression.

Without abandoning our claimed right to enforce no fly zones in the north and

the south, curtail routine flights while restating our red lines in a clear and unambiguous

manner, so that Iraq does not venture into the north, mobilize

against Kuwait or the population in the south of the country, or threaten any

other country in the region. Seek firm assurances from our friends and allies

in the region that bases would be available for military operations, should we

determine that Iraq is resuming its efforts to develop and deploy weapons of

mass destruction or is mounting military operations.

In light of these changes, seek support from states in the region for efforts to

curtail the embargo-violating oil exports and to help curtail illegal smuggling

in and out of Iraq. We would be able to argue that these can no longer be justified

on humanitarian grounds since the UN would now be permitting Iraq to

spend funds on all activities that might alleviate the current suffering of the

Iraqi people.

In order to increase the attractiveness of this package to Russia and France we

should consider permitting, or even requiring, that Iraq use some of its revenue

from the sale of oil, to pay its existing debts to other nations including these two

members of the UNSC. Our friends and allies in the region should find it easy to

support this package since it will be clear that the embargo cannot be responsible

for the continued suffering of the Iraqi people. Of course, that is the case now, since

the Iraqi regime has at its disposal sufficient resources, both from the authorized

sales and from the illegal sales, to do whatever is necessary to deal with the humanitarian

tragedy in that country. The leadership prefers instead to use the funds for

its own pleasures and for weapons. However, this new approach should reduce the

criticism that the embargo is responsible for the humanitarian crisis.

I believe this approach would gain the needed support of states in the region and

of the UNSC and that it could be sustained over a long period of time until there

is a change in the Iraqi regime.

Of course, many believe that we should not wait for such change to occur on its

own, and that we should instead implement the stated policy and goal of regime

change by vastly increased support to the Iraq opposition.

There can be no doubt that American and, indeed, international security interests,

would be advanced if the current regime in Iraq were to be replaced by one which

was more committed to meeting the obligations which Iraq undertook at the end of

the Persian Gulf War. The question is only whether there are means to do that

which are consistent with other American interests and priorities and which could

get the necessary support from the American people and from other nations. I do

not believe that there are such means.

Certainly we have the conventional military power to defeat the Iraqi Army and

occupy that country. There was a fleeting moment at the end of the Gulf War when

it was plausible that the United States would use its military power to change the

Iraqi regime. There is no longer any such possibility. Unless Iraq threatens a new

act of aggression, the American people would not, and should not, support such an

effort, nor would our allies and friends provide the necessary bases and support.

Thus, those who want to remove the current regime advocate not an American

military operation, but rather a ‘‘covert operation.’’ I do not believe there is any real

option that involves only a covert operation. As in many previous situations, the real

aim of the covert operation would be to try to compel the United States to use military

force to rescue an operation which was failing. Indeed, most of the Iraqi opposition

groups which seek the weapons to launch operations inside of Iraq warn us that

they will expect American military support.

Anyone advocating a serious and determined effort to change this regime in the

short run by covert force, bears a very heavy burden of demonstrating that such an

effort has a real chance of success without massive American military action. Otherwise

we run a grave risk of once again abandoning brave Iraqis, who rise up in the

mistaken belief that we will defend them, or find ourselves dragged into a war that

we cannot sustain.

Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate this opportunity to present my views and

stand ready to answer the questions of the committee.

Let me make two comments. First, I think when

we look at these comparisons we need to understand that this is

a regime that is much more ruthless than the ones that ultimately

we helped to liberate. This is a regime that still lives on absolute

terror, in which there is no space at all for any kind of not only

opposition, but civil society of any kind, in the areas that Saddam

Hussein controls, so I think the process of getting rid of this kind

of regime is very different than the South African Government that

ultimately was displaced and the Central European Government.

Milosevic I think was as dangerous to our interest,

but life in Belgrade under Milosevic was nothing like life—I

mean, there were independent radio stations. They tried to close

them down and they went on the Internet.

It tells us it is going to be much harder.

I agree.

I think the rhetoric has been the same about both

of them. I think the difference was, it was a lot easier to get rid

of Milosevic than it is Saddam Hussein, and I think it comes to the

question of military force.

Now, Richard says that if we encourage these areas and the

tanks start moving, that is a very tempting military target, and

one that we can attack. That is true, but I think the history of air

power is that you do not completely stop tank operations, or other

ground operations, with military power.

We saw that with Milosevic. The destruction in Kosovo continued

and was brought to an end only because Milosevic finally was

forced to give up, not because our bombing raids stopped him from

killing people, and I simply do not think we can count on either

the threat of air power or the actual implementation of air power.

I am not suggesting we not do it. I think we ought to have that

debate, but the debate I think has to accept that if he moves, we

bomb, and if the bombing does not work, we intervene with ground

forces, and that means having the ground forces there before he

moves, because if we wait to start sending in the ground forces

after we discover again that bombing does not stop tanks, you destroy

a lot of tanks but you do not stop them from killing people,

it is going to be too late for the people who are being killed.

I do not believe that they could sustain the safe

havens without substantial American military force, and I guess I

am less optimistic than Richard is, that if they were left in these

safe havens, which they occupied, as I said, a substantial portion

of the country earlier on, I do not believe it has the same kind of

impact as we see in political elections, or even as we saw in politics

in Eastern Europe because of the nature of this regime.

I believe it is a pure totalitarian regime that remains in power

based on the worst kinds of terrorism, and therefore I think, while

a miracle can always happen, that if we go into this, we have to

go into it with the notion that there is going to have to be a substantial

American military involvement, and that air power alone

is not likely to be enough, and whether it is a smaller land force,

as Richard suggests, or a bigger one that I suggest, at least some

of the people in this administration would want to be sure that it

succeeded. I think we have to assume that.

I would also have to say that while I think one should never rely

entirely on experts, it is not true that this administration—I mean,

the past administration and, I assume, the one before that, did not

look at the hard question of whether you get rid of Saddam Hussein

by supporting the opposition, and the people who get paid to

do that in various agencies of the government reached the conclusion

that you could not. Now, they may be wrong, but it is not the

case that people just dismissed it without taking a look at it.

I do not advocate it, because I think the cost to

the United States and the cost to our relationships with other

countries, and the cost to our ability to use the Security Council for

other purposes, would outweigh the value. I would like to get rid

of this man, but I think that cost is not worth it.

Senator, I agree with you that we cannot afford

to continue to drift. I think there are two disastrous policies. One

is to continue to drift, and the other is to start support for the opposition

that we are not prepared to carry forward, but I think

there are two real policies, one is the one of deciding we are going

to get rid of him and support the opposition to the degree that that

is necessary. I do not see how you do that over 3 years, because

I do not think this can be a slow process.

Richard is right, you have got to do something decisive and be

prepared to back it up. I do not see a sort of gradualism here that

does any good, but I do think there is an alternative.

I do not believe that moving to a different set of sanctions of the

kind that I have outlined inevitably means we are getting out.

What I think it means is that we establish something that is permanent

and something that will have the necessary support both

in the region and with the U.N. Security Council, not to stop everything,

but to put Saddam Hussein in a position where he cannot

engage in conventional military operations either in his country or

beyond it, and where his ability to expand his weapons of mass destruction

program is not eliminated, but contained, and that we

then confront them with a classic containment situation, which I

think we could sustain as long as we have to.

I think, in other words, we can go to a new form of containment

which is sustainable.